Host Security and Integrity Monitoring
Tamper-Evident Integrity Monitoring for Critical OS Components
Research ID: system-integrity-monitoring
Detect unauthorised changes to protected files, executables, configuration and security policy, and distinguish them from legitimate updates.
Problem statement
Investigate how Black Wall can detect unauthorized changes to protected files, executable components, configuration, and security policies.
Why it matters
Persistence usually requires changing something on disk or in policy. Integrity monitoring makes those changes visible, but only if it can tell an authorised update apart from an unexpected modification and record the evidence without itself being altered.
Research questions
- 01 Which components need integrity coverage, and at what granularity?
- 02 How are trusted baselines and signed manifests created, stored and updated?
- 03 How can authorised updates be distinguished from unexpected modifications without a manual decision every time?
- 04 What monitoring overhead and detection latency are acceptable on a running system?
Research objectives
- Establish trusted baselines and signed manifests.
- Distinguish authorized updates from unexpected modifications.
- Investigate tamper-evident records.
- Evaluate monitoring overhead and detection latency.
- Develop reproducible integrity-verification tests.
Technical challenges
- Baselines must change with legitimate updates without becoming attacker-controlled.
- Continuous verification competes with normal I/O and can be expensive at fine granularity.
- Tamper-evident records require somewhere trustworthy to anchor their integrity.
- Detection latency depends on when a change is observed, not only on when it occurred.
Expected outcome
A prototype integrity-monitoring system with documented coverage and limitations.
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